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Abstract: With the rapid development of cloud computing, it is playing an increasingly important
role in data sharing. Meanwhile, attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been an effective way to
share data securely in cloud computing. In real circumstances, there is often a mutual access
sub-policy in different providers’ access policies, and the significance of each attribute is usual
diverse. In this paper, a secure and efficient data-sharing scheme in cloud computing, which is
called unified ciphertext-policy weighted attribute-based encryption (UCP-WABE), is proposed.
The weighted attribute authority assigns weights to attributes depending on their importance.
The mutual information extractor extracts the mutual access sub-policy and generates the mutual
information. Thus, UCP-WABE lowers the total encryption time cost of multiple providers. We prove
that UCP-WABE is selectively secure on the basis of the security of ciphertext-policy weighted
attribute-based encryption (CP-WABE). Additionally, the results of the implementation shows that
UCP-WABE is efficient in terms of time.
Keywords: attribute-based encryption; cloud computing; data sharing
1. Introduction
As one of the most promising applications, cloud computing [1–3] provides a more efficient way
for data sharing. It enables data providers to store their data remotely in a cloud, and once data
consumers can access the cloud, they can access the data any time and anywhere. Despite cloud
computing supplying great convenience for data sharing, it also brings the serious challenge of
information security [4]. Massive data are stored in the cloud storage platforms, and the data often
contain sensitive information, such as personal health records in the medical cloud [5–7] and banking
transactions in the financial cloud [8–10]. An untrustworthy entity named the cloud service provider
(CSP) runs the cloud storage platforms, and it may steal the sensitive information to make a profit.
Therefore, how to enforce a secure and efficient data sharing in the cloud has attracted many scholars’
attention [11–14].
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [15] is a widespread cryptographic technology to protect
the security of data in cloud computing. Different from traditional public key encryption, ABE
does not encrypt plaintexts for an explicit consumer. Consumers’ secret keys and ciphertexts are
associated with a set of attributes or an access policy, respectively. A consumer can decrypt a
ciphertext if and only if his/her secret key has a match with the ciphertext. Weighted attribute-based
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encryption [16–21] is a variant of ABE. It assigns different weights to attributes according to their
importance. For example, we can give full professor and distinguished professor with weights one
and two, denoted as “professor(1)” and “professor(2)”, respectively. This can avoid a very complicated
access structure and improve the efficiency of the encryption in certain scenarios.
1.1. Problem Statement
In practical applications [7,22], different data providers share their own data with weighted access
policies, and these policies may have a mutual sub-policy. A simple instance is given to elucidate
this issue.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the data providers have data M1 and M2 to share separately.
The weighted access policy of M1 is Γ1{Attr3(3) AND (Attr1(2) AND Attr2(3))}. The weighted access
policy of M2 is Γ2{Attr4(2) AND (Attr1(2) AND Attr2(3))}. We notice that there is a mutual sub-policy
{Attr1(2) AND Attr2(3)} between Γ1 and Γ2, and this means that the encryptions of M1 and M2
have some processes of repetition. This provides the possibility of improving the efficiency of the
data sharing.
Figure 1. Two data providers have data M1 and M2 to share separately. Γ1 and Γ2 are the weighted
access policies of M1 and M2.
1.2. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new data-sharing scheme, which is called unified ciphertext-policy
weighted attribute-based encryption (UCP-WABE), in cloud computing. UCP-WABE achieves both
security and high performance. In this scheme, every attribute has its own weight depending on
its importance defined in the system. The data providers share their data under their weighted
access policies. When there is a mutual sub-policy among the weighted access policies, UCP-WABE
optimizes the encryption of the data. UCP-WABE is proven to be selectively secure [23] on the basis of
CP-WABE [16]. We carry out experiments for UCP-WABE, and the implementation results exhibit that
UCP-WABE has better efficiency.
1.3. Organization
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Section 3
introduces preliminaries. In Section 4, we present the system model and security model of UCP-WABE.
Section 5 proposes our data-sharing scheme. Section 6 represents the security analysis of UCP-WABE.
The implementation results are presented in Section 7. Finally, the conclusions are stated in Section 8.
2. Related Work
As a popular cryptographic primitive used in cloud computing, ABE has two categories. One is
ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [24], and the other is key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [25]. The major
difference between CP-ABE and KP-ABE is the relationship of the ciphertext and secret key with
the access policy and attributes. Specifically, for the former, a ciphertext is associated with an access
policy that is expressed by threshold gates and attributes. A consumer’s secret key has attributes
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embedded. For the latter, a ciphertext is associated with attributes, and an access policy is embedded
into a consumer’s secret key. CP-ABE enables data providers to construct its access policy freely;
in other words, the providers describe who can get the shared data flexibly. Therefore, CP-ABE is more
suitable for data sharing in the cloud.
In order to increase the efficiency and enlarge the use scope of ABE for data sharing, many
researchers have made great efforts. Liu et al. [17] introduced the concept of weight into CP-ABE
and proposed a ciphertext-policy weighted attribute-based encryption scheme. In this scheme, the
authority transforms the attribute set into the weight attribute separation set, then the data provider
encrypts the data with linear secret sharing methods [26]. Although the size of the ciphertext and
private key increases, the scheme achieves fine-grained access control and reflects the significance
of attributes. Therefore, the scheme is more suitable for the practical applications. However, the
scheme only supports the linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [27] access structure. On the basis
of [17], Liu et al. [18] proposed another ciphertext-policy weighted attribute-based encryption scheme
that supports threshold access structure [28]. This structure can consist of a threshold and many
attributes. Therefore, this scheme is more expressive and is more appropriate for the cloud computing
environment. Meanwhile, the scheme is proven secure under the selective-weighted attribute model.
Nevertheless, the scheme only supports the threshold access structure, which only contains one
threshold gate in one structure, and this still limits the expression. Wang et al. [19] proposed a
multi-authority-based weighted attribute encryption scheme, which introduced the concept of weight
into multi-authority-based attribute encryption [29]. In this scheme, a central authority assigns a
unique user identifier (UID) to each consumer. The UID is the global identity of a consumer in the
system, and it is used to generate the attribute secret keys issued by multiple authorities. The attribute
authorities assign different weights to attributes depending on their importance; whereas, the scheme
only supports the threshold access structure. Liu et al. [16] proposed an improved ciphertext-policy
weighted attribute-based encryption (CP-WABE) to improve the efficiency over the traditional CP-ABE
scheme. In this scheme, every attribute has its own weight according to its importance. The data
provider encrypts its data under a weighted access policy. The data consumer can decrypt the
ciphertext only if his/her attributes satisfy the weighted access policy. The scheme supports the tree
access structure, so it can encrypt data under a more complex access policy. The scheme is proven
to be secure under the decision `-Expanded bilinear Diffie–Hellmann exponent (`-Expanded BDHE)
assumption [30]. Ghosh et al. [21] proposed a secure and efficient data collaboration scheme, which
is called blowfish hybridized weighted attribute-based encryption. In this scheme, The weight is
assigned to each attribute based on its importance, and data are encrypted using access control policies.
The consumers can access the data corresponding to their weight in order to reduce the computational
overload. Nevertheless, when there is a mutual sub-policy among the access policies of providers,
all above-mentioned schemes do not consider further optimization.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts of bilinear mapping [31] and the weighted access
tree [16].
3.1. Bilinear Mapping
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p with the multiplication. Let g be a
generator of G1 and ê be a bilinear mapping. Let ê : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear mapping having the
following properties:
• Bilinearity: For any u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zp, Zp is the set of integers [0, p − 1]. It has
ê(ua, vb) = ê(u, v)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: ê(g, g) 6= 1.
• Computability: For all u, v ∈ G1, there is an efficient computation ê(u, v).
Note that ê is symmetric since ê(ua, vb) = ê(u, v)ab = ê(ub, va).
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3.2. Weighted Access Tree
A weighted access tree is an image representation of a weighted access policy. Let Γ be a weighted
access tree. Let Nj be the nodes of Γ and N1 be the root of Γ. There are two kinds of nodes in Γ,
non-leaf node and leaf node. The former represents a threshold gate, for example “AND”, “OR”, “a
of b (a < b)”. numj and Vj describe the threshold gate, where numj denotes the number of children
of Nj and Vj denotes the threshold value, 0 < Vj 6 numj. When Vj = numj, the threshold gate is an
AND gate, and when Vj = 1, it is an OR gate. A leaf node is described by a data consumer’s attribute
with weight, and Vj = 1. We denote the parent of Ni by parent(Ni) and denote the index for Ni in its
parent’s children by index(Ni), where 1 6 index(Ni) 6 numi.
In Γ, every non-leaf node Nj corresponds to a function Vj/numj. Vj/numj is a Boolean function,
and it is TRUE if Nj has at least Vj child nodes whose Boolean functions are evaluated to be TRUE.
We say that a data consumer’s attribute set S satisfies Γ if Γ(S) = TRUE, which is defined as
described below.
For any leaf node Nj that is associated with an attribute ai ∈ S, if its Boolean value is TRUE,
the weight of ai from S must be greater than or equal to the weight of Nj. For any non-leaf node, its
Boolean value is the value of its Boolean function. If and only if the tree’s root node’s Boolean value is
TRUE, then Γ(S) = TRUE.
For instance, as shown in Figure 1, two weighted access trees correspond to two weighted access
policies. Γ1 : {Attr3(3) AND (Attr1(2) AND Attr2(3))}, Γ2 : {Attr4(2) AND (Attr1(2) AND Attr2(3))}.
Considering a data consumer whose attribute set S is {Attr1(3), Attr2(3), Attr3(4), Attr4(1)}. We could
calculate that Γ1(S) = TRUE, Γ2(S) = FALSE. Table 1 gives several outcomes of Γ(S) with different
attribute sets S.
Table 1. Valuation of the weighted access trees in Figure 1.
S Γ1(S) Γ2(S)
Attr1(3), Attr2(2), Attr3(4), Attr4(2) FALSE FALSE
Attr1(3), Attr2(3), Attr3(2), Attr4(2) FALSE TRUE
Attr1(3), Attr2(3), Attr3(4), Attr4(1) TRUE FALSE
Attr1(3), Attr2(3), Attr3(4), Attr4(2) TRUE TRUE
4. System Model and Security Model of UCP-WABE
In this section, we describe the system model and security model of UCP-WABE. The system
model shows how UCP-WABE enforces data sharing in cloud computing. The security model makes a
foundation for the security analysis in Section 6.
4.1. System Model of UCP-WABE
Figure 2 displays the data-sharing system using UCP-WABE in the cloud environment.
This system model is improved from the system model of CP-WABE [16]. The system model consists
of five types of entities: a weighted attribute authority (WAA), a mutual information extractor (MIE),
a cloud storage platform, numerous data providers, and data consumers. The cloud storage platform
is managed by CSP and offers data storage service due to its massive storage ability. The provider’s
data are encrypted with its weighted access policy and uploaded to the cloud. The data consumer
downloads the ciphertexts and decrypts them with his/her secret key to recover the data. All providers
and consumers are supervised by WAA. WAA is responsible for authenticating the attributes of every
data consumer. WAA also assigns different weights to attributes according to their importance.
The MIE assists the providers in encrypting their data. For illustration, we consider two providers in
the system.






Figure 2. System model of UCP-WABE.
In Figure 2, WAA is a trustworthy entity that is in charge of producing the data consumers’ secret
keys. CSP is honest but curious. This means that the cloud implements the manipulations dutifully
and gives true outcomes; whereas, it also tries its best to get sensitive information. A data consumer
could be compromised by an adversary; thus, this consumer could make attempts at obtaining data
beyond his/her access range. The communication channels among the providers, the consumers,
as well as the cloud are unsafe. In other words, the data in these channels could be eavesdropped by
the adversary.
4.2. Security Model of UCP-WABE
The security model of UCP-WABE is described by a selective security game between a challenger
and an adversary. This game is borrowed from CP-WABE [16]. The phases of the game are the following:
Init: The adversary declares the challenge weighted access policy Γ∗ that he/she will try to attack
and sends Γ∗ to the challenger.
Setup: Here, the challenger calls the Setup algorithm to generate and send the public parameters
to the adversary.
Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can adaptively query for secret keys for the weighted
attribute sets Sq1,Sq2, · · · to the challenger. The challenge weighted access policy Γ∗ must not be
satisfied by any one of the queried attribute sets. The challenger responds by running the KeyGen
algorithm to generate the corresponding secret keys SKq1, SKq2, · · · .
Challenge: The adversary submits two messages of the same length m0, m1. Then, the adversary
makes a weighted access policy Γ′ that there is a mutual access sub-policy between Γ∗ and Γ′. Γ′ is
sent to the challenger, as well. The challenger flips a random coin b R←− {0, 1} and encrypts mb under
Γ∗. The ciphertext CT∗ is given to the adversary.
Phase 2: This phase is the same as Phase 1. The adversary asks for more secret keys, and the same
restriction is that Γ∗ must not be satisfied by any one of the queried attribute sets.
Guess: The adversary outputs his/her guess b′ on b.
Definition 1. A UCP-WABE scheme is selectively secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most
a negligible advantage in the above security game, where the advantage of an adversary is defined as
Adv = Pr[b′ = b]− (1/2) [32].
According to this definition, if we prove that there is no such polynomial time adversary who has
a non-negligible advantage in the above security game, we can prove that UCP-WABE is selectively
secure. The details of the proof will be described in Section 6.1.
5. Proposed Unified Ciphertext-Policy Weighted Attribute-Based Encryption
This section first gives an overview of our scheme. Then, we articulate the proposed UCP-WABE
data-sharing scheme, which consists of five algorithms.
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5.1. Overview of UCP-WABE
In UCP-WABE, different providers’ weighted access trees can be merged into one if and only if
the trees meet two conditions. One is that there is a mutual sub-policy between the weighted access
trees. The other is that the sub-trees’ roots of every weighted access tree locate in a trunk. A merging
process is displayed in Figure 3. The two weighted access policies belong to different providers and
have a mutual sub-policy: {Attr3(3) AND (Attr1(2) OR Attr2(3))}. All roots of the left weighted access
tree are in the trunk: “AND”–“AND”–“OR”. All roots of the right weighted access tree are in the
trunk: “OR”–“AND”–“OR”. Therefore, the two conditions are met, and the weighted access trees can















Figure 3. The merging process of two weighted access trees.
5.2. The Design of UCP-WABE
UCP-WABE can be described as a collection of the following five algorithms:
Setup(1λ,U ). This algorithm generates the public parameters (PP) and the master secret key
(MSK). WAA runs Setup, which takes a security parameter λ and the set of all attributes U in the
system as input. Each attribute has a weight depending on its importance in the system, and let li be
the maximum weight of attribute ui, where ui ∈ U .
WAA chooses a group G1 of prime order p with generator g and random group elements
{hi,end, hi,j}∀ui∈U ,j=0,··· ,li . WAA also chooses a random exponent α ∈ Zp and computes PP as:
PP =
{
G1, g, ê(g, g)α, {hi,end, hi,j}∀ui∈U ,j=0,··· ,li
}
. (1)
The master key of the system MSK can be calculated as:
MSK = g−α. (2)
PP is released to all the data providers and data consumers.
MutualInfoGen(PP, Γ1, Γ2). In [24], the cpabe toolkit [33] can transform an access policy into a
stylized expression. Therefore, MIE is able to extract the mutual sub-policy when providers’ access
policies meet the two conditions. Then, MIE creates an access tree Γε according to the mutual sub-policy.
Let Yε denote the set of the leaf nodes in Γε. Each element of Yε represents an attribute (denoted by ai)
with a weight (denoted by ωi). The number of leaf nodes is denoted by kε. ∀ai ∈ Yε. Let (i, j) denote
the jth part of ai, where j = 1, · · · , ωi. MIE chooses a polynomial fc(x) for every node of Γε. Let the






where bi denotes the polynomial coefficient. Moreover, let Nε denote the root of Γε. MIE picks a
random quantity s = fε(0) ∈ Zp and randomly chooses other dε points of fε(x) to determine fε(x).
MIE selects fq(x) for the non-root node Nq of Γε, where:
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fq(0) = fparent(Nq)(index(Nq)). (4)
MIE randomly picks the other dq points to determine fq(x). Therefore, it can get the polynomials
fc(·) for any Nc ∈ Γε.
MIE chooses random values s1,0, · · · , s1,ω1−1, · · · , skε ,0, · · · , skε ,ωkε−1 ∈ Zp, and creates the mutual
information MI as follows:
∀ai ∈ Yε, i = 1, · · · , kε, MIE first calculates:
C(i,0),1 = g
si,0 , C(i,0),2 = (hi,0)
si,0 . (5)
Then, for j = 1 to ωi − 1, MIE calculates:
C(i,j),1 = g
si,j , C(i,j),2 = (hi,j)
si,j · H(ai)si,j−1 . (6)
When j = ωi, let si,j = fai (0), where fai (·) is the polynomial of the node whose attribute is ai.
MIE calculates:
C(i,j),1 = g
fai (0), C(i,j),2 = (hi,j)
fai (0) · H(ai)si,j−1 . (7)
Then, MIE calculates:
C(i,end),1 = g
fai (0), C(i,end),2 = (hi,end)
fai (0). (8)
Finally, MIE creates the mutual information MI:
MI =
{
Γε, {C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2}∀ai∈Yε ,j=1,··· ,ωi , {C(i,end),1, C(i,end),2}∀ai∈Yε
}
. (9)
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of the MutualInfoGen algorithm.
Algorithm 1 The mutual information generation algorithm (MutualInfoGen).
Input: PP: The public parameter. Γ1: The weighted access tree of Provider A. Γ2: The weighted access
tree of Provider B.
Output: MI: The mutual information.
1: Create Γε according to the mutual sub-policy of Γ1 and Γ2
2: Select a random s ∈ Zp; set fε(0) = s; and randomly choose other dε points to determine fε(x)
3: for ∀ non-root node Nq do
4: Calculate fq(0), and randomly choose other dq points to determine fq(x)
5: if ai ∈ Yε then
6: Calculate C(i,0),1, C(i,0),2
7: for j = 1 to ωi do
8: if j 6= ωi then
9: Calculate C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2
10: else
11: Set si,j = fai (0), and calculate C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2
12: end if
13: end for





Γε, {C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2}∀ai∈Yε ,j=1,··· ,ωi , {C(i,end),1, C(i,end),2}∀ai∈Yε
}
Encrypt(PP, M1, Γ1, MI). MIE sends MI to the providers. Then, they encrypt the messages
M1, M2, respectively. Consider Provider A as an instance. It runs Encrypt as follows. Provider A
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creates the access tree Γ1 based on Γε, which is a sub-tree of Γ1. For any trunk node Nc above Nε in Γ1,
the polynomial fc(x) is determined as follows.
fc(index(trunkchild(Nc))) = ftrunkchild(Nc)(0), (10)
where trunkchild(Nc) denotes the child node of Nc along the trunk and index(Nc) is the index value of
Nc to its parent node. In order to calculate conveniently, when providers construct the access policies,
it sets index(trunkchild(Nc)) = 1 for each trunk node. For dc non-constant coefficients of (3), Provider
A selects them randomly. Then, the constant term fc(0) can be computed by (10). Taking a simple






Provider A selects dδ coefficients {b1, b2, · · · , bdδ} randomly, and index(trunkchild(Nδ)) = 1.
Due to (10), Provider A knows that:
fδ(1) = fε(0), (12)






Similarly, MIE determines every trunk node’s polynomial. For any other node Nq of Γ1, the
method of determining fq(x) is identical to the method of MIE creating Γε.
Provider A obtains every polynomial of node in Γ1 with (4) and (10), and Γ1 is created completely.
Provider B creates Γ2 based on Γε likewise.
Let Y1 denote the set of the leaf nodes in Γ1. The number of leaf nodes is denoted by k1. Provider
A produces the ciphertext CT1 of message M1 as follows:
Provider A first calculates CM = M1 · ê(g, g)α fN1 (0), where fN1(·) is the polynomial of access tree
Γ1’s root node N1. For ∀ai∈Y1\Yε, i= kε + 1, · · · , k1, Provider A chooses random values skε+1,0, · · · ,
skε+1,ωkε+1−1, · · · , sk1,0, · · · , sk1,ωk1−1 ∈ Zp, and calculates:
C(i,0),1 = g
si,0 , C(i,0),2 = (hi,0)
si,0 . (14)
Then, for j = 1 to ωi − 1, MIE calculates:
C(i,j),1 = g
si,j , C(i,j),2 = (hi,j)
si,j · H(ai)si,j−1 . (15)
When j = ωi, let si,j = fai (0), where fai (·) is the polynomial of the node whose attribute is ai.
MIE calculates:
C(i,j),1 = g
fai (0), C(i,j),2 = (hi,j)
fai (0) · H(ai)si,j−1 . (16)
Then, MIE calculates:
C(i,end),1 = g
fai (0), C(i,end),2 = (hi,end)
fai (0). (17)
Finally, Provider A creates the ciphertext CT1:
CT1 =
{
Γ1, CM, {C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2}∀ai∈Y1,j=1,··· ,ωi , {C(i,end),1, C(i,end),2}∀ai∈Y1
}
. (18)
Algorithm 2 represents the pseudocode of Encrypt algorithm.
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KeyGen(PP, MSK,S). WAA calls this algorithm to produce SK on the basis of MSK and the data
consumer’s attributes. Particularly, ∀ai ∈ S, let ω′i denote the weight of ai, and let (i, j) denote the
jth part of ai, where j = 1, · · · , ω′i . For each (i, j), WAA chooses Di,j ∈ G1 and ri,j ∈ Zp randomly.
WAA also chooses random values ri,endj ∈ Zp. WAA generates SK components as follows:
K(i,0),1 = D(i,0)(hi,0)
ri,0 , K(i,0),2 = g
ri,0 , K(i,j),1 = D
−1
(i,j−1) · H(ai)
ri,j , K(i,j),2 = g
ri,j , (19)
K(i,j),3 = D(i,j)(hi,j)
ri,j , K(i,endj),1 = g
−α · D(i,j)(hi,end)
ri,endj , K(i,endj),2 = g
ri,endj . (20)
Algorithm 2 The encryption algorithm (Encrypt).
Input: PP: The public parameter. M1: The data that Provider A wants to share. Γ1: The weighted
access tree of Provider A. MI: The mutual information.
Output: CT1: The ciphertext of M1.
1: Create Γ1 based on Γε
2: for ∀ trunk node Nc above Nε ∈ Γ1 do
3: Calculate fc(1); select dc non-constant coefficients randomly; and calculate fc(0)




8: for ∀ non-trunk node Nq ∈ Γ1 do
9: Determine fq(x) the same as MutualInfoGen
10: if ai ∈ Y1\Yε then
11: Calculate C(i,0),1, C(i,0),2
12: for j = 1 to ωi do
13: if j 6= ωi then
14: Calculate C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2
15: else
16: Set si,j = fai (0), and calculate C(i,j),1, C(i,j),2
17: end if
18: end for










{K(i,0),1, K(i,0),2, K(i,j),1, K(i,j),2, K(i,j),3, K(i,endj),1, K(i,endj),2}∀ai∈S,j=1,··· ,ω′i
}
. (21)
Decrypt(PP, SK, CT1). Consider that the aforementioned consumer gets CT1, and he/she wants
to recover M1. The decryption process is defined as follows.
If Nx is a leaf node of Γ1 and is associated with attribute ai ∈ S and ωi 6 ω′i , let Nx’s Boolean
value be TRUE, and calculate:













Then, for j = 1 to ωi:
F(x,j) = F(x,j−1)
ê(C(i,j−1),1, K(i,j),1) · ê(C(i,j),1, K(i,j),3)
ê(C(i,j),2, K(i,j),2)
(23)
When j = 1 to ωi − 1,
F(x,j) = ê(g, D(i,j))
si,j . (24)
When j = ωi,
F(x,j) = ê(g, D(i,ωi))
fai (0). (25)






fai (0) · ê((hi,end) fai (0), g
ri,endωi )
ê(g fai (0), g−α · D(i,ωi)(hi,end)
ri,endωi
=ê(g, g)α fai (0).
(26)
ai is the attribute of leaf node Nx, so fai (·) = fx(·), and:
Fx = ê(g, g)α fai (0) = ê(g, g)α fx(0). (27)
Equations (22) and (24)–(26) are on the basis of bilinear mapping properties, which were
introduced in Section 3.1. If ai ∈ S, ωi > ω′i or ai /∈ S, then Fx =⊥, and ⊥ is a termination signal.
For a non-leaf node Nx of Γ1, let Nz be the children of Nx and Sx be an arbitrary Vx-size set of Nz,






ê(g, g)α fz(0)∆z,Sx (0)
= ∏
z∈Sx
ê(g, g)α fx(z)∆z,Sx (0)
=ê(g, g)αΣz∈Sx fx(z)∆z,Sx (0)
=ê(g, g)α fx(0).
(28)
where ∆z,Sx (y) = Πi∈Sx ,i 6=j
y−i
j−i is the Lagrange coefficient polynomial.
Therefore, if the access tree Γ1 is satisfied by S, the decryption algorithm begins from the root
node N1, and the consumer calculates:




M1 · ê(g, g)α fN1 (0)
ê(g, g)α fN1 (0)
= M1. (29)
Algorithm 3 displays the pseudocode of Decrypt algorithm.
Figure 4 shows the working process of UCP-WABE for unified encryption. Figure 5 displays the
process flow of a consumer for decryption.
Algorithm 3 The decryption algorithm (Decrypt).
Input: PP: The public parameter. SK: The secret key of the consumer. CT1: The ciphertext of M1.
Output: M1: The plaintext of CT1.
1: for ∀ leaf node Nx ∈ Γ1 do
2: if attribute of Nx ∈ S, and ωi 6 ω′i then
3: Set Nx’s Boolean value to be TRUE, and calculate F(x,0)
4: for j = 1 to ωi do
5: if j 6 ωi − 1 then
6: Calculate F(x,j) = ê(g, D(i,j))
si,j
7: else






13: Set Fx =⊥
14: end if
15: end for
16: for ∀ non-leaf node Nx ∈ Γ1 do
17: Set Nz as the children of Nx and Sx as an arbitrary Vx-size set of Nz, where Fz 6=⊥.
18: if @Sx then
19: Set Fx =⊥
20: else
21: Set Nx’s Boolean value to be TRUE, and calculate Fx
22: end if
23: end for
24: if FN1 ’s Boolean value is TRUE then




Figure 4. The process flow of unified encryption.
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Figure 5. The process flow of decryption.
6. Security Analysis
6.1. Security Proof
Extended from CP-WABE, UCP-WABE is expected to have the same security property as
CP-WABE, which has been proven to be selectively secure under a variant of the decision `-bilinear
Diffie-Hellmann exponent (BDHE) assumption [16]. Based on the selective security of CP-WABE,
we prove UCP-WABE is selectively secure.
Theorem 1. If no polynomial time adversary can selectively break CP-WABE with a weighted challenge access
policy Γ∗, no polynomial time adversary can selectively break UCP-WABE with Γ∗.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we assume that there exists a polynomial time adversary A, which
has a non-negligible advantage AdvA in selectively breaking UCP-WABE. Using A, we will
build a polynomial time adversary B, which selectively breaks CP-WABE with a non-negligible
advantage AdvB .
Init: A declares a challenge weighted access policy Γ∗ and sends it to B. B sends Γ∗ to the
CP-WABE challenger.
Setup: The public parameter of CP-WABE PP =
{
G1, g, ê(g, g)α, {hi,end, hi,j}∀ui∈U ,j=0,··· ,li
}
is sent
to B, then B sends PP′ = PP to A.
Phase 1: A makes secret key queries to B for attribute sets, and none of these sets satisfy the
challenge access policy Γ∗. SupposeA asks for attribute set Sq1. B gives Sq1 to the CP-WABE challenger
and gets SKq1 =
{
{K(i,0),1, K(i,0),2, K(i,j),1, K(i,j),2, K(i,j),3, K(i,endj),1, K(i,endj),2}∀ai∈Sq1,j=1,··· ,ω′i
}
. B returns
SK′q1 = SKq1 to A to answer the query. This process would repeat until A no longer queries.
Challenge: A submits two messages of the same length m0, m1. Then, A constructs a
weighted access policy Γ′ that there is a mutual access sub-policy between Γ∗ and Γ′. Γ′ is
also sent to B. B sends m0, m1 to the CP-WABE challenger. The CP-WABE challenger flips a
random coin b R←− {0, 1} and encrypts mb with Γ∗. The ciphertext is CT =
{
Γ∗, Cmb , {C(i,j),1,
C(i,j),2}∀ai∈Y1,j=1,··· ,ωi , {C(i,end),1, C(i,end),2}∀ai∈Y1
}
, and the CP-WABE challenger sends it to B. B
constructs challenge ciphertext CT∗ as CT∗ = CT and returns it to A.
Phase 2: A asks for more secret keys, and the same restriction is that Γ∗ must not be satisfied by
any one of the queried attribute sets. B answers as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}, and B outputs b′ in its own game. B has an advantage in
breaking CP-WABE as
AdvB = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| = AdvA
Thus, B has a non-negligible advantage in selectively breaking CP-WABE, so the proof of the
theorem is completed.
Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 2519 13 of 18
6.2. Discussion
In UCP-WABE, CSP cannot know the details of the data because the data are stored in an encrypted
form. The data are encrypted under a weighted access policy, so only the consumers who possess
a set of weighted attributes satisfying the policy can decrypt the ciphertext. Hence, UCP-WABE
achieves a fine-grained access control, and the confidentiality of the data can be guaranteed against
unauthorized consumers. A data provider constructs the weighted access policy according to the
data consumers’ attributes instead of the data consumers’ detailed information. The threshold gates
are also used to construct the weighted access policy. Therefore, the providers are able to construct
sophisticated weighted access policies, and there is no limit to the number of threshold gates and
attributes. Thus, UCP-WABE can support an extremely large number of weighted access policies,
and UCP-WABE can implement flexible access control.
7. Evaluation of the Encryption Efficiency
The theoretical efficiency analysis of UCP-WABE is first given, then we carry out the experiments,
and the results show that UCP-WABE has better efficiency than other schemes.
7.1. Efficiency Analysis Based on Encryption Methodologies
C(Gi) denotes the operation in group Gi(i = 0, 1). Cê denotes the operation in ê(·). In order to
analyse the efficiency conveniently, suppose the number of levels of Γ1 is equal to Γ2’s and each level
has the same number of attributes. Thus, Γ1, Γ2 have the same number of attributes, i.e., k1 = k2.
Let B(∗) be the bit size of an element of ∗ and | ∗ | be the number of elements of ∗. Let S(Γ1) denote the
least node set that satisfies Γ1. The comprehensive comparison among CP-ABE [24], CP-WABE [16],
and our proposed UCP-WABE is summarized in Table 2. Moreover, the hash computation cost does
not have to be included because it is very small.
Table 2. Comprehensive analysis.
Component CP-ABE CP-WABE UCP-WABE








li + 2|U |+ 1)B(G1) + B(G2)
Master key size B(Zp) + B(G1) B(G1) B(G1)





















(li −ωi + 1)·














(li −ωi + 1)·






































ωi + 3|S(Γ1)|+ 1)C(G2)
Weighted Attributes NO YES YES
Unified Encryption NO NO YES
As shown in Table 2, suppose the values of li are given. When k1 and ωi are fixed, the encryption
time cost declines with kε in UCP-WABE. In order to display the results more intuitively, we suppose
all the attributes have the same weight in the access trees Γ1, Γ2 and all the maximum weights are
the same in U . Therefore, the time cost of encryption linearly declines with kε, and the rate of
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descent is 4(ωi + 1)C(G1) in UCP-WABE. In CP-ABE and CP-WABE, the encryption time cost remains
unchanged. When kε and ωi are fixed, the encryption time cost linearly rises with k1, and the growth
rate is 8(ωi + 1)C(G1) in UCP-WABE. Although the growth rate of encryption time cost is also equal
to 8(ωi + 1)C(G1) in CP-WABE, it is always higher than that in UCP-WABE. The encryption time cost
increases with k1 exponentially in CP-ABE. When k1 and kε are fixed, the encryption time cost linearly
rises with ωi, and the growth rate is (8k1 − 4kε)C(G1) in UCP-WABE. The encryption time cost also
linearly rises with ωi, and the growth rate is 8k1C(G1) in CP-WABE. In spite of the encryption time cost
declining with ωi in CP-ABE, it still remains far higher than UCP-WABE. In Table 2, one noteworthy
fact is that the encryption time cost is a summation of the two data providers’ encryption time.
7.2. Efficiency Analysis Based on Implementation
The implementation of UCP-WABE is on the basis of the cpabe toolkit [33] and the Pairing-Based
Cryptography library [34]. The implementation uses a 160-bit elliptic curve group based on the
supersingular curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512-bit finite field. The experiments are conducted on a PC,
in Intel Core2 Duo with 3.00-GHz CPU and 2GB RAM, running Ubuntu15.04. We compare UCP-WABE
with CP-WABE and CP-ABE in the field of encryption time cost. For all experiments, we make all
the weighted access policies’ threshold gates “AND” gates. This ensures that all of the ciphertext
components could be calculated in Decrypt.
Figure 6 shows the encryption time cost with given experimental conditions k1 = 27, ωi = 3,
and li = 4 (i = 1, · · · , 7), li = 3 (i = 8, · · · , 27). We do not suppose all the attributes have the same
maximum weight in this case for the reason that the result of CP-ABE is too high. The number of
mutual attributes used in the experiments is kε = {2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26}. As shown in Figure 6,
the encryption time cost of UCP-WABE follows a linear decline with the number of the mutual access
tree attributes. For CP-WABE and CP-ABE, the encryption time cost almost keeps unchanged.
























Figure 6. Encryption time cost for the changed number of mutual access tree attributes.
Figure 7 displays the encryption time with kε = 3, ωi = 3 and li = 4. In the experiments,
the number of Γ1’s attributes is k1 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. As shown in Figure 7, the encryption time cost
follows a linear growth with the number of the access tree attributes in UCP-WABE and CP-WABE.
Meanwhile, the former is lower than the latter. The result of CP-ABE increases exponentially with the
number of access tree attributes.
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Figure 7. Encryption time cost for the changed number of access tree attributes.
Figure 8 shows the encryption time cost with given experimental conditions k1 = 3, kε = 2, and
li = 9. The weight of attributes in Γ1 used in the experiments is ωi = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Figure 8 shows
that the encryption time cost of UCP-WABE and CP-WABE is following a linear growth in the weight
of attributes, and the former is lower than the latter. The result of CP-ABE is decreasing with the
weight of attributes; however, it is still higher than UCP-WABE. Therefore, UCP-WABE improves the
efficiency of encryption.


























Figure 8. Encryption time cost for the changed weight of attributes in the access tree.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel UCP-WABE scheme for sharing data in cloud
computing environments. The scheme optimizes the encryption of data that are encrypted under
the multi-providers’ access policies where these policies have a mutual sub-policy. UCP-WABE
utilizes a mutual information extractor to extract the mutual sub-policy and produce mutual
information, which assists in optimizing the encryption. UCP-WABE also takes advantage of weighted
attribute-based encryption to avoid too complex of an access structure. We analyse the computational
complexity of UCP-WABE theoretically and experimentally. The analyses indicate that UCP-WABE
has a better efficiency of encryption. The security analysis shows that UCP-WABE is selectively secure.
It should be noted that we only consider the case of two data providers. In practice, UCP-WABE will
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have a more efficient data sharing if the more providers’ access policies have a mutual sub-policy. In
our future work, we will optimize the system implementation and conduct comprehensive experiments
with real-life cases in cloud computing.
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Abbreviations and Notations
The following abbreviations and notations are used in this manuscript:
UCP-WABE unified ciphertext-policy weighted attribute-based encryption
Mi the data that provider i wants to share
Γi the weighted access tree relates to Mi
ê(·) a bilinear mapping
G1 ê(·)’s input group
G2 ê(·)’s output group
p G1’s order, namely there are p elements in G1
Zp the set of integers [0, p− 1]
g G1’s generator. ∀i ∈ Zp, gi ∈ G1
Nj the jth node in Γ
numj Nj’s children number
Vj Nj’s threshold value
S the attribute set of a data consumer
ai the ith attribute of a data consumer
WAA weighted attribute authority
MIE mutual information extractor
PP, MSK the public parameter and master secret key of UCP-WABE
SK secret key of a data consumer, issued by WAA
U the set of all attributes in the system
ui the ith attribute in U
li the maximum weight of ui
ωi the weight of ai from Γ
ω′i the weight of ai from S
ki the number of leaf nodes in Γi
Nε the root node of the mutual access tree
MI the mutual information
H(·) the hash function to hash an attribute
CTi the ciphertext of Mi
⊥ termination signal
C(Gi) the operation in Gi
Cê the operation in ê(·)
B(∗) the bit size of an element of ∗
| ∗ | the number of elements of ∗
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